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D3.5 Digital database for video content promoting extremist narratives report

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Abstract	The SMIDGE Video Platform is a link-based, researcher-curated database that offers access to selected videos that may be associated with extremist content. Rather than hosting extremist material, the platform stores only public URLs accompanied by verified metadata: upload date, language, channel details, a neutral synopsis, a topic tag (far-right, religious extremism, conspiracy, anti-vax, climate-hoax, hybrid). Ethical safeguards—including strict researcher-well-being protocols and a mandatory responsible-use disclaimer—ensure the tool remains a map of narrative flows, not a megaphone for extremist ideas.
Key Words	SMIDGE Database, Online Extremism, Extremist Narratives, Radicalization, Social-Media

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1. Introduction

In line with Work Package 3 (WP3) of the SMIDGE project, which is dedicated to examining current online extremist discourse, Task 3.3 called for creating an online platform cataloging the characteristics of digital videos associated with extremist narratives. Led by KCSS, with contributions from FAS, the team set out to build a comprehensive resource that would support researchers and policymakers in understanding how online media influence radicalization processes.

This platform aims to serve as a central hub where key details of online content, ranging from video titles and links to their ideological underpinnings, are collected and made accessible. By gathering insights into extremist narratives on social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and X, this database helps shed light on how and why certain types of content resonate with specific audiences. Ultimately, the platform aims to inform more effective strategies for countering radicalization, whether by guiding the creation of counter-narrative campaigns or informing policy interventions.

A team of researchers at KCSS has taken the lead in populating the database with relevant data, under the guidance of the SMIDGE consortium. This effort involves a rigorous process of identifying content that meets specific criteria. The resulting database preserves this information for long-term use and presents it via a user-friendly dashboard.

By consolidating the essential attributes of extremist video content, the SMIDGE Database stands to become a vital reference point for anyone seeking to mitigate online radicalization. Its design and scope reflect a forward-thinking approach to understanding how extremist messages circulate online. It also provides a tool for developing actionable responses to the spread of harmful narratives.

With the ever-growing influence of social media and the rapid proliferation of video-sharing platforms, online spaces have become a fertile ground for the dissemination of extremist narratives. Individuals and groups seeking to radicalize or recruit followers often rely on visual media to convey compelling messages that resonate with audiences vulnerable to extremist or radical ideologies. These online videos can serve multiple purposes: propaganda, recruitment material, or subtle ideological reinforcement. Recognizing this, the SMIDGE Database aims to capture a broad spectrum of video content across various platforms and ideological contexts to illuminate how extremist messages circulate, evolve, and potentially influence viewers.

The central vision behind this database is to act as a robust and user-friendly resource for researchers, policymakers, journalists, educators, and other stakeholders. By offering a detailed, searchable repository of key characteristics, such as title, link, thematic focus, extremist ideology, or narrative type, target audience, and keywords, this platform can help stakeholders better understand how radicalization might occur in digital contexts. In turn, these insights can guide more informed policy decisions, support the crafting of targeted counter-narratives, and reinforce community-level initiatives to prevent radicalization.

2. Designing and Developing the Platform

The creation of the SMIDGE Database began with a search for any existing tools or platforms that document online videos with extreme content. Although the research team looked for similar databases or comparable projects, none matched the SMIDGE project vision for this platform. This realization led to thinking of new solutions. Over about a month, the KCSS SMIDGE project team and other KCSS staff discussed possible approaches during their weekly meetings. These conversations helped them decide what the platform should accomplish and how it should function.

Once the basic idea was in place, the KCSS team contacted a web developer they had worked with on previous projects, such as the annual Western Balkans Security Barometer survey platform. The team met with the developers to explain the concept, share technical requirements, and explore what was feasible. These discussions resulted in a clearer picture of how the platform would look and what features it would include. The overarching goal was to balance the visual presentation of data (quantitative information) with more detailed descriptions of each video (qualitative information).

From these early planning sessions, the team established two main pillars for the platform: a statistical and informational pillar. The statistical pillar presents an overview of the data, including the breakdown of videos by four main categories identified by the SMIDGE project: far-right, religious, conspiracy, and anti-vax. It also features a chart that shows platforms (such as Facebook, YouTube, or X) from which these videos were gathered and a map that illustrates the geographic distribution of the videos' origins. Meanwhile, the informational pillar provides a table that lists each video alongside key details: title, link, a brief description, the category of extremist content, the country where the video was produced (if known), keywords, language, and intended audience. In many cases, determining the intended audience was difficult, so this field often required interpretation by the research team.

In addition to these two core sections, a dedicated area of the platform allows anyone who visits the site to report a video that they believe contains extremist material. When a report is submitted, it goes directly to an official KCSS email address. The KCSS staff then reviews the information and decides whether it meets the criteria for inclusion in the database.

After the conceptual phase was complete, the project moved into technical development. While the developers were building the platform, the SMIDGE project team began searching for content to fill it. They organized a workshop to plan how researchers search social media platforms for videos. To protect the researchers from prolonged exposure to disturbing or hateful material, the team arranged for them to alternate tasks, take regular breaks, and discuss their findings with colleagues. This approach helped reduce stress and ensured a healthier work environment as they gathered evidence of extremist content.

By blending technical functionality with careful research, the SMIDGE Database aims to offer reliable statistics and detailed descriptions that shed light on how extremist content circulates online. The final product combines user-friendly data visualization with the ability to report new content, all within a platform that strives to be comprehensive and considerate of the well-being of the researchers who maintain it.




Figure 1: Dashboard of the platform containing key statistical data

DASHBOARD LIST ABOUT REPORT

☐	Title	Description	Year	Date Recorded	Language	Origins	Target Audience
☐	Free Palestine #palestine	A video of a young person inciting hate of Jewish communities in support of Palestine. - Deleted in the meantime.	2023	2023-10-19	English	United Kingdom	Unsure
☐	France is also on their hit list.	Palestinian leader in Turkey claims they are ready to blow themselves up against France, to protest the damage to the image of the Prophet Muhammad by critics of Islam: "We Are Willing To Sacrifice Our Soul And Our Blood"	2023	2023-11-12	English	Turkey	Unsure
☐	World Family Congress in Verona	World Family Congress in Verona right now - a big network of Anti-Choice-Activists, among them a lot of persons from the far right. At noon I made a video of an aggressive man with a Pit-Bull, who was showing his ass to LGBT-Activists in order to show his antipathy towards them. Moreover the man shouted "Salvini is one of us", in front of the hall, where Salvini gave a speech today. Later he attacked a cameraman and spit on him. I filmed it and the video was watched 56.000 times by now on twitter. I guess, I made that Ass famous. - Deleted in the meantime	2019	2023-11-12	Italian	Italy	Unsure
☐	Hitler knew how to deal	This video depicts a person telling the camera that Hitler knew	2023	2023-11-12	English	United Kingdom	Unsure

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Figure 2Table containing key details of each video

Report a video

If you feel that you have come across a video that spreads radicalism or misinformation, do not hesitate to report it using the below form. The link will be reviewed by our team members and will be added in due time.

Figure 3: Option for visitors of the platform to report videos containing extremist narratives



3. Scope and Criteria for Video Qualification

This platform catalogs videos found on widely used social media channels: YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and X. These platforms were chosen because of their broad global reach and the rapid rate at which information, even extremist content, can circulate. Including these platforms in the database allows the SMIDGE project team to analyze how extremist narratives emerge, evolve, and potentially influence online communities.

Drawing on the goals of Work Package 3, the SMIDGE Database focuses on four primary types of extremist narratives. While some videos may overlap multiple categories, each entry is classified based on its most prominent features:

1. Far-Right
 - Videos that promote or advocate racial or ethnic superiority.
 - Content featuring anti-Semitic themes or hatred directed at Jewish communities.
 - Material embracing white supremacist ideologies, or calling for the suppression of multiculturalism and multiethnicity.
 - Narratives championing authoritarian regimes or denouncing democratic processes.
 - Anti-EU rhetoric and attacks on the values that the European Union promotes.
 - Fear- or hate-based messaging against migrants, as well as videos glorifying “strongman” leaders who suppress dissent and media freedom.
2. Conspiracy Theories and Dis/Misinformation
 - Videos distorting widely accepted facts, often inspire fear or hostility toward specific groups, institutions, or government bodies.
 - QAnon-related content or materials suggesting hidden, nefarious plots against the public.
 - Narratives rejecting vaccination based on false claims, especially those that incite others to refuse medical guidance or turn against public health agencies.
3. Militant and Violent Narratives
 - Videos endorsing violence or brutality based on ethnic identity, religious views, or political beliefs.
 - Calls to take up arms against communities or individuals.
 - Glorification of terroristic or vigilante acts, sometimes framed as necessary for achieving specific ideological goals.
4. Religious Extremist Narratives
 - Videos justifying or praising violence in the name of a specific faith.
 - Calls to reject religious pluralism, secularism, or peaceful coexistence, often accompanied by derogatory comments toward other faiths.
 - Material that idolizes or promotes known extremist organizations (e.g., ISIS, Al-Qaeda), especially those recognized as terrorist groups by the European Union.
 - Content encouraging violence, discrimination, or hate speech targeted at people who advocate for abortion rights or at members of the LGBTQ+ community.

Within these broad categories, the SMIDGE Database includes essential details such as the video's title, a link to the original post, a short description, and any pertinent keywords. The team notes the intended target audience where possible, although this can be difficult to discern.

4. Ethical and Methodological Framework

Creating a platform that catalogues videos associated with extremist content is not merely a technical exercise, it is an ethical undertaking that touches on researcher well-being, data reliability, privacy, and the potential downstream use—or misuse—of the information we curate. The KCSS SMIDGE project team therefore treats methodology and ethics as two sides of the same coin and has built a workflow that makes those concerns visible at every step. What follows explains, in a single narrative, how videos are selected, double-checked, and released, and what users are—and are not—invited to do with the resulting data.

Unlike large commercial threat-intelligence platforms that lean on full-scale web scraping, the SMIDGE project platform relies primarily on manual collection by researchers. There are three reasons for that choice. First, extremist discourse is highly coded and culture-specific; automated keyword harvesting either drowns us in false positives or misses the subtle jokes, symbols, and dog-whistles that give a clip its real meaning. Second, manual review allows the team to apply the same ethical lens at the moment of capture, rather than bolting responsibility on afterwards. Third, our funding and GDPR obligations favour a “links-only” approach: we store the URL, channel name, publication date, and a short coded description—not the video file itself—thereby avoiding the mass replication of potentially illegal content.

Step 1 — Initial capture: Researchers scrape the open channels on YouTube, TikTok, X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, Instagram, and Telegram. When they encounter material that appears to advance or celebrate extremist narratives, they paste its URL into a spreadsheet and fill in the mandatory fields: platform, provisional narrative tag, date found, and a one-line reason for inclusion (e.g., “advocates ethnic cleansing,” “QAnon reference,” “anti-vax conspiracy”). The spreadsheet is stored on the KCSS Microsoft Teams folder giving the whole team real-time visibility.

Step 2 — Classification: The researcher who logged the clip completes a fuller template directly inside the spreadsheet. The template mirrors the database schema:

- *Title and Link:* Record the exact title (if provided by the uploader) and the active link.
- *Description:* Summarize the video's main message. Avoid graphic detail, but capture specific keywords or rhetoric that illustrate extremist elements.
- *Category:* Assign the video to the most fitting category (Far-Right, Religious, Conspiracy, Anti-Vax, or overlapping if necessary).
- *Language:* Note the primary language spoken or displayed.
- *Keywords:* Highlight notable terms, hashtags, or slogans.
- *Geographic Origin:* If identifiable, document where the video originated or the region it targets.
- *Target Audience:* If discernible, indicate the demographic or group the video primarily addresses (e.g., youth, religious community, political supporters).

Step 3 — Peer verification: Another research staff member opens the same video, works through the template independently, and records any disagreements in a “verification” column. After the two researchers confer does the entry move from the spreadsheet to the live database. In other words, no record is born without dual observation and explicit consent.



The word *extremist* is elastic. To keep the project defensible, the team agreed early on to use a four-part decision matrix. A clip does not need to meet every bullet, but the more boxes it ticks, the stronger the case for inclusion.

Table 1: Criteria matrix for the videos

No.	Description	Criteria
1.	Nature of the message	- open advocacy or justification of violence; - explicit hate speech (e.g., racist slurs, calls for genocide); - promotion of conspiratorial claims aimed at delegitimising democratic institutions.
2.	Intended audience signals	- recruiting language (“join us,” “arm yourself,” “wake up”); - movement symbols, slogans, or well-known extremist hashtags; - shout-outs to specific online communities or subcultures
3.	Source and reach	- initial publication on mainstream or mainstream-adjacent platforms, indicating a bid for wider influence; - viral markers—high view count, rapid share velocity, or amplification by influential accounts.
4.	Contextual cues	- coded phrases (e.g., “white genocide” “great replacement”) that tie the video to a recognized ideology; - linguistic or cultural markers that locate the narrative in one of the SMIDGE countries (Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Kosovo, Cyprus, United Kingdom) or their diaspora communities.

The database was never conceived as a catalogue of *only* overtly extremist propaganda. Our research aims to illuminate the narrative funnel that can lead people toward radical or extremist worldviews. For that reason, the platform deliberately includes data from videos that are more than the apparent hate sermons or open calls to violence. It also stores the softer, seemingly unrelated material that—empirically—often primes people for radical messages. When a SMIDGE researcher tags a clip “far-right,” “religious-extremism,” “anti-vax,” or “conspiracy,” the label is not a legal verdict on the video, nor a prediction that every viewer will become radicalized or see it in that manner. It is simply a research shorthand that tells future users that this link potentially touches a narrative that is associated with extremist content.

Because our purpose is to map narrative pathways, we log only what is needed for that task: The public URL (so anyone can verify the source themselves); Contextual metadata—date, language, channel, etc; and A short, neutral description and one or more narrative tags. We do not copy or re-host the video file. Keeping only the link avoids reproducing hateful or copyrighted material and ensures that any subsequent use is governed by the policies of the platform where the video originally appeared.

In practical terms, a single anti-vaccination clip might enter the database with the topic tag anti-vax and the note “claims government hides vaccine fatalities.” That record tells analysts the video sits inside a distrust-of-authority storyline that extremists have been known to exploit—but it stops well short of calling the clip, its creator, or its audience “extremist.” The same logic applies to a sermon flagged religious-extremism or a talk show tagged conspiracy. We catalogue links because they can become building blocks in radical narratives, not because they must. Not every anti-vaccination clip is extremist, and the database is intentionally broader than a pure catalogue of overt hate or explicit



calls to violence. Our remit is to map the narrative ecosystem that can potentially feed the radicalization process.

We work with three concentric circles of content.

At the core sit overtly extremist videos: speeches that applaud terrorism, chants that call for ethnic cleansing or violence, slick recruitment montages produced by recognized organisations. These clips are few but non-negotiable; they show audiences and tactics in their rawest form. The next circle is what we call radical or extremist-adjacent rhetoric. Here the language is still “us-versus-them” and moralistic, yet it stops just short of open incitement. These items matter because they launder hard-edge ideas into a tone that can pass on mainstream platforms; they bridge ordinary grievance and explicit hatred. The widest circle captures high-salience disinformation and misinformation material that is not automatically extremist, but that repeatedly surfaces in radicalization pipelines. Anti-vaccination videos sit here by default. Most anti-vax clips do not praise violence; some may even reflect genuine anxiety. Yet the format is handy to extremist entrepreneurs: it attacks scientific authority, polarizes community life, and sometimes scapegoats minorities. When such a clip merely spreads medical falsehoods, we keep it in this outer circle; when it moves on to blaming a target group or urging violent “resistance,” it receives an additional inner-circle flag.

The KCSS SMIDGE project team seeks to refine these criteria over time, with each new batch of videos prompting adjustments to maintain consistency and accuracy. Manually curating extremist content can exact a psychological toll, so the team embeds three safeguards.

- Time-boxed shifts. Watch sessions are capped, after which researchers must switch to a neutral task or take a break.
- Buddy debriefs. Any researcher who views graphic violence or explicit hate speech chat with a peer to decompress.
- Well-being check-ins. Staff run one-to-ones that cover workload, emotional state, and whether adjustments are needed.

The database is fully open to the public. It is important to note that the platform is a sample, not a census or a comprehensive database of videos associated with extremist content. The collection is opportunistic: the absence of evidence should not be read as evidence of absence, especially in smaller language communities or closed networks. KCSS SMIDGE project teams label content type, not the level of risk it poses.


A database of extremist videos is only as valuable as the confidence users place in it. By foregrounding manual capture, dual verification, researcher care, and explicit user guidance, SMIDGE offers a resource that is rigorous enough for academic analysis yet transparent about its limits.

Finally, the KCSS SMIDGE project team for the platform views its methodology as a living framework. Regular reviews will be conducted to refine procedures, classifications, and practices for keeping researchers safe. For example, Feedback Loops: Researchers and team members provide input on the usefulness of the criteria and any challenges encountered during categorization, and Interdisciplinary Insights: Conversations, when possible, with internal experts in KCSS and external experts, informed adjustments to how the content was interpreted and classified. These efforts ensure the SMIDGE Database maintains an ethical foundation and methodological rigor. By clearly defining what was included, protecting the mental health of the research staff, and prioritizing responsible data handling, the team created a tool that maps extremist content and does so with integrity and respect for those involved in its creation and analysis.



5. Launch of the platform

On October 23, 2024, the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS) and the SMIDGE project announced the launch of a new digital platform for identifying and analyzing online videos associated with extremist narratives. The platform helps deepen understanding of online radicalization and supports efforts to design effective counter-extremism initiatives and policies.



The newly launched platform incorporates a database documenting the core characteristics of selected videos that appear to be associated with extremist content on major social media channels, including YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and X. Each entry includes essential details such as the video's title, link, a brief description, the

nature of the extremist narrative (e.g., Anti-Vax, religious, far-right), the target audience, and keywords.

In line with its commitment to sustaining project data and improving digital safety, the KCSS SMIDGE project team structured the platform as a “one-stop shop” for those researching extremist narratives. A dedicated KCSS team continually updates the database with selected videos. Notable features of the platform include:

- **Interactive Dashboard:** A user-friendly interface that enabled project members and authorized users to input and retrieve data efficiently.
- **Open Data Portal:** A publicly accessible table-like component that provides global access to researchers and other interested stakeholders, promotes transparency, and facilitates additional research on online radicalization.

Speaking about its purpose, Ramadan Ilazi, head of research at KCSS and a member of the SMIDGE project team, stated that the platform is a research tool aimed at helping policymakers and researchers better understand and counteract the influence of online media on radicalization. SMIDGE Scientific Project Lead, Sara Wilford, noted that the database served as a unique resource in the fight against online extremism. Tamara Pavlović, a KCSS researcher involved in populating the platform, highlighted the complexity of verifying users' ages and locations and identifying the sources of videos. She also mentioned the emotional strain when reviewing material intended to provoke fear and anger. Donika Elshani, who participated in the platform's development, emphasized that systematically cataloging these videos and their attributes enhanced the collective capacity to design targeted interventions against radical content. Following its launch, the SMIDGE Digital Platform became accessible at: <https://qkss.smidgeproject.eu/>

6. Link with the broader SMIDGE project research

The SMIDGE Digital Video Database seeks to serve as an empirical spine that threads the project's work packages together. The database operationalises insights from the Horizon Scanning review (D3.1) by turning the abstract taxonomy of extremist storytelling into a machine-readable catalogue



of real-world videos. Each entry—title, URL, platform, narrative tag, audience cue, and brief synopsis—supplies the common data language allowing later work packages to talk to one another.

In WP4, the social-network and text-analysis teams ingest the video links as seed nodes for their crawler scripts. The Telegram and YouTube channel lists extracted from our database define the starting points for the large-scale scraping exercises reported in D4.1/D4.2. Because every video in the database already includes categorization which echoes the narrative labels identified in the respective reports (e.g., “New World Order”, “Great Replacement”, “Spiritual Awakening”). The same identifiers underpin the sentiment study in D4.3, where user-comment emotion scores are mapped back to the narrative categories first fixed in the database, revealing which story-types trigger the most assertive anger–disgust blend.

When the survey team designed the middle-age vulnerability questionnaire (Progress Report on Online Survey), they lifted verbatim thumbnail images and short transcripts from the database to create credible stimuli. Using authentic material ensured that survey respondents evaluated content identical to what circulates in their feeds, thereby increasing ecological validity and allowing direct comparison between self-reported susceptibility scores and the platform engagement metrics housed in the database. The interim counter-video report (D6.1) stated that the production team “used the digital database D3.5 to benchmark effective formats and delivery styles.” Without this evidence, counter-content risked missing the aesthetic vernacular of its target audience.

In short, the Digital Video Database is the hinge between exploratory mapping, quantitative modelling, behavioural testing, and creative intervention. It supplies a validated sampling frame for technical analyses (WP4), authentic stimuli for psychological instruments (WP5), audience-tuned creative benchmarks for strategic communications (WP6), and Shared ethical protocols for all empirical tasks, should they be chosen to be applied.

7. Utilizing the platform

Following the platform's launch, KCSS ran a “rapid-analysis sprint” to prove that the tool can turn raw video metadata into policy-relevant commentary. Three early-career researchers—Vesa Shatri¹, Agnesa Bytyqi², and Vesa Kroci³—were each given a simple brief: pick a pressing theme (far-right extremism, conspiracy theories, or climate discourse), spend two days exploring the database, and draft an op-ed that would ground the assertions in a verifiable clip from the database. The exercise had three purposes. First, it stress-tested the platform’s usability: could a new user move from login to publishable insight without specialist support? Second, it demonstrated transparency to external readers. Each blog post hyperlinks to the exact video record so that facts, dates, and narrative tags can be audited in a single click. Third, it showcased how modest investments in data literacy empower emerging voices to enter public debate with evidence, not intuition.

Shatri’s piece, *Charting the Rise of Far-Right Extremism* (13 Feb 2025), began with a cross-language query for “AfD + Kosovo” and, in minutes, surfaced dozens of TikTok re-uploads that repackaged German parliamentary speeches for Serbian nationalist audiences. By mapping hashtag diffusion with

¹ See the blog post by Vesa Shatri at SMIDGE Project web site: <https://www.smidgeproject.eu/post/charting-the-rise-of-far-right-extremism-how-the-smidge-project-informs-policy-and-practice>

² See the blog post by Agnesa Bytyqi at the SMIDGE Project web site: <https://www.smidgeproject.eu/post/countering-conspiracies-how-smidge-database-can-help-curb-dangerous-narratives>

³ See the blog post by Vesa Kroci at SMIDGE Project web site: <https://www.smidgeproject.eu/post/facts-over-fear>



the built-in graph view, she showed how a message that starts in Berlin can re-emerge in the Balkans stripped of context but armed with fresh ethnic resonance. Her recommendation—that EU counter-narrative teams monitor cross-border reframing, not just domestic output—flows directly from those visualisations.

Bytyqi’s essay, *Countering Conspiracies* (14 Mar 2025), used the timeline filter to study 9/11-related clips that spike each September. The edit-history log revealed how thumbnails, captions, and comment sections mutate year-on-year, gradually grafting anti-government suspicion onto newer grievances such as COVID mandates or energy prices. That granular view helped her explain why debunking a single claim rarely kills a conspiracy: the narrative survives because its emotional payload is continually rewired to fresh anxieties. She urges journalists to cite the database when tracing origin stories, shifting coverage from “rumours swirl” to “here is the first appearance, and here is how it evolved.”

Kroci’s contribution, *Facts over Fear* (20 Mar 2025), focused on climate-change videos tagged “apocalypse” or “hoax.” By overlaying sentiment scores on watch-time data, she showed that clips combining high fear language with policy nihilism drive more extended engagement than straightforward denialism. That finding supports her call for communicators to pair risk messaging with tangible adaptation wins, closing the emotional loop that extremists exploit.

Collectively, the sprint confirmed the platform’s value chain: tagged metadata → rapid discovery → evidence-rich narrative → actionable insight. Each op-ed moved from query to publication in under three weeks, illustrating how the database can feed real-time discourse without sacrificing rigour. The full texts live on the KCSS and SMIDGE websites to keep the main report concise.

Table 2: How did each blog utilize the database?

Blog	Core question	Key database functions used	Takeaway for practitioners
Charting the Rise of Far-Right Extremism (Vesa Shatri, 13 February 2025)	How are far-right video narratives adapted across borders?	Cross-language search; hashtag diffusion graphs	Policymakers should track how domestic speeches (e.g., AfD MPs) are reframed in Balkan social-media debates before designing counter-messaging.
Countering Conspiracies (Agnesa Bytyqi, 14 March 2025)	Why do crisis events spawn durable conspiracy loops?	Timeline view; edit-history log	Journalists can timestamp narrative mutations and spotlight when fringe claims harden into extremist recruitment tools.
Facts over Fear – Climate Narratives (Vesa Kroci, 20 March 2025)	Which video frames link climate anxiety to anti-system grievance?	Topic heat-map; sentiment overlay	Climate communicators should pre-empt fear-based frames by pairing data visualisation with localised adaptation success stories.



8. Conclusion

The SMIDGE video platform is, above all, a research lens. By cataloguing public-web links, annotating them with clear narrative tags, and logging minimal metadata, it lets scholars, journalists, and policymakers trace how disinformation, grievance stories, and explicit extremist messages braid together across time and geography. It is a map of possible pathways—not a repository of propaganda. It may also contain videos that showcase stories of processes of radicalization.

Equally important is what platform is not. It is not a streaming service; we host no video files and therefore do not amplify the content we study. It is not a real-time threat feed or a substitute for operational intelligence; risk tiers highlight context, not imminent danger. And it is not a stamp of legal judgement on the creators whose links appear in the index. Tags such as anti-vax or conspiracy flag proximity to narratives that have been weaponised elsewhere, but they do not declare the material itself extremist.

By remaining rigorously descriptive—link, context, verified tag—the SMIDGE platform provides a transparent foundation for evidence-based analysis while guarding against both inadvertent amplification and over-interpretation.